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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) support data col-
lection and distributed data processing by means of very small
sensing devices that are easy to tamper and cloning: therefore
classical security solutions based on access control and strong
authentication are difficult to deploy. In this paper we look at the
problem of assessing security of node localization. In particular,
we analyze the scenario in which Verifiable Multilateration is
used to localize nodes and a malicious node try to masquerade as
non-malicious. We resort to non-cooperative game theory and we
model this scenario as a two-player game. We analyze the optimal
players’ strategy and we show that the Verifiable Multilateration
is indeed a proper mechanism able to reduce the profitability of
fake positions. Our analysis demonstrates that, when the verifiers
play a pure strategy, the malicious node can always masquerade
as unknown with a probability of one and the induced deception
could be not negligible. Instead, when the verifiers play mixed
strategies, the malicious node can masquerade as unknown with
a very low probability and the expected deception is virtually
negligible.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [1], [2] technologies
support data collection and distributed data processing by
means of very small sensing devices. Sensors are increasingly
used in many contexts such as surveillance systems, systems
supporting traffic monitoring and control in urban/suburban
areas, military and/or anti-terrorism operations, telemedicine,
assistance to disabled and elderly people, environmental moni-
toring, localization of services and users, and industrial process
control. This activities rely greatly on data about the positions
of sensor nodes, not necessarily know at design time. In fact,
nodes are often deployed randomly or move, and one of the
challenges is getting localization data at time of operations.
Several localization approaches have been proposed (for ex-
ample, [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]), but most
of them omit to consider that WSNs could be deployed in
an adversarial setting, where hostile nodes under the control
of an attacker coexist with faithful ones. In fact, wireless
communications are easy to tamper and nodes are prone to
physical attacks and cloning: thus classical solutions, based
on access control and strong authentication, are difficult to
deploy.
An approach to localize nodes even when some of them
are compromised was proposed in [12] and it is known as
978-1-4244-7286-4/10/$26.00 c© 2010 IEEE
Verifiable Multilateration (VM). However, in some situations
also using Verifiable Multilateration the security localization
behavior of a node is undefined, in other words there is not
enough information for establishing with certainty whether
it is a trusty or a malicious node. This weakness could be
exploited by a malicious node to masquerade as an undefined
one, pretending to be in a position that is still compatible with
all verifiers’ information. To the best of our knowledge, the
analysis of this scenario has not been explored so far in the
literature: we explicitly consider how a malicious node, on
the one side, could act and, on the other side, how the system
could face it. This constitutes the original contribution of our
work.
In this paper, we resort to non-cooperative game theory to
study our scenario. More precisely, we model it as a two-
player strategic-form game, where the first player is a verifier
that uses VM and the second player is a malicious node. The
verifier acts to securely localize the malicious node, while
the malicious node acts to masquerade as undefined. As is
customary in game theory, the players are considered rational
(i.e., maximizers). This amounts to say that the malicious
node is modeled as the strongest adversary. We study the
game, showing some results concerning the robustness of
VM. The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides
a short overview about Verifiable Multilateration; Section III
shortly describes secure localization game, providing some
basic concepts; Section IV introduces strategic game analysis.
Section V draws some conclusions and provides hints for
future works.
II. VERIFIABLE MULTILATERATION
Multilateration is a technique used in WSNs to estimate
the coordinates of some unknown nodes, given the positions
of other given landmark nodes, called anchor nodes, whose
positions are already known. The position of an unknown node
U is computed by geometric inference based on the distances
between the anchor nodes and the node itself. However, the
distances are not measured directly; instead, they are derived
by knowing the speed of the signal in the medium used in
the transmission, and by measuring the time needed to get the
answers to a beacon message sent to U .
Unfortunately, if this computation is carried on without
any precaution, U might fool the anchors by delaying the
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Fig. 1. Verifiable multilateration
beacon message. However, since a malicious node can delay
the answer beacon, but not speed it up, under some conditions
it is possible to spot malicious behaviors. VM uses three or
more anchor nodes to detect misbehaving nodes. In VM the
anchor nodes work as verifiers of the localization data and
they send to a sink node B the pieces of information needed
to evaluate the consistency of the coordinates computed for U .
The basic idea of VM is shown in Figure 1: each verifier Vi
computes its distance bound [13] to U ; any point P 6= U
inside the triangle formed by V1, V2, V3 has necessarily at
least one of the distance to the Vi enlarged. This enlargement,
however, cannot be masked by U by sending a faster message
to the corresponding verifier.
Under the hypothesis that verifiers are trusted and they
can securely communicate with B, the following verification
process can be used to check the localization data:
1) Each verifier Vi sends a beacon message to U and
records the time τi needed to get an answer;
2) Each verifier Vi (whose coordinates 〈xi, yi〉 are known)
sends to B a message with its τi;
3) From τi, B derives the corresponding distance bound
dbi (which can be easily computed if the speed of the
signal is known) and it estimates U ’s coordinates by
minimizing the sum of squared errors
 =
∑
i
(dbi −
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2)2
where 〈x, y〉 are the (unknown) coordinates to be esti-
mated1;
4) B can now check if 〈x, y〉 are feasible in the given set-
ting by two incremental tests: (a) δ-test: For all verifiers
Vi, compute the distance between the estimated U and
Vi: if it differs from the measured distance bound by
more than the expected distance measurement error, the
estimation is affected by malicious tampering; (b) Point
in the triangle test: Distance bounds are reliable only if
1In an ideal situation where there are no measurement errors and/or
malicious delays this is equivalent to finding the (unique) intersection of the
circles defined by the distance bounds and centered in the Vi (see Figure 1)
and  = 0.
the estimated U is within at least one verification triangle
formed by a triplet of verifiers, otherwise the estimation
is considered unverified.
If both the δ and the point-in-the-triangle tests are positive,
the distance bounds are consistent with the estimated node
position, which moreover falls in at least one verification
triangle. This means that none of the distance bounds were
enlarged. Thus, the sink can consider the estimated position
of the node as ROBUST; else, the information at hands is not
sufficient to support the reliability of the data. An estimation
that does not pass the δ test is considered as MALICIOUS. In all
the other cases, the sink marks the estimation as UNKNOWN.
In an ideal situation where there are no measurement errors,
there are neither malevolent nodes marked as ROBUST, nor
benevolent ones marked as MALICIOUS. Even in this ideal
setting, however, there are UNKNOWN nodes, that could be
malevolent or not. In other words, for UNKNOWN nodes there
is not enough information for evaluating the trustworthiness
of node position. In fact, U could pretend, by an opportune
manipulation of delays, to be in a position P that is credible
enough to be taken into account. No such points exist inside
the triangles formed by the verifiers (this is exactly the
idea behind verifiable multilateration), but outside them some
regions are still compatible with all the information verifiers
have.
Consider N verifiers that are able to send signals in a
range R. Let x0 and y0 the real coordinates of U . They are
unknown to the verifiers, but nevertheless they put a constraint
on plausible fake positions, since the forged distance bound to
Vi must be greater than the length of UVi since delays have
to be positive.
Thus, any point P = 〈x, y〉 that is a plausible falsification
of U has to agree to the following constraints, for each 1 ≤
i ≤ N :
{
(y − yi)2 + (x− xi)2 < R2
(y − yi)2 + (x− xi)2 > (y0 − yi)2 + (x0 − xi)2 (1)
The constraints in (1) can be understood better by looking
at Figure 2, where three verifiers are depicted: the green area
around each verifier denotes its power range, and the red area
is the bound on the distance that U can put forward credibly.
Thus, any plausible P must lay outside every red region and
inside every green one.
III. SECURE LOCALIZATION GAME
Our aim is the study of the behavior of a possible malicious
node that acts to masquerade itself as an unknown node and,
at the same time, how the verifiers can face the malicious
node at best. This is a typical non-cooperative setting that
can be analyzed by leveraging on game theoretical models.
A game is described by a couple: mechanism and strategies.
The mechanism defines the rules of the game in terms of
number of players and actions available to the players. The
strategies describe the behaviors of the players during the
game in terms of played actions. Strategies can be pure,
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Fig. 2. Plausible falsification region: P is a plausible fake position for U
since lays outside every red region and inside every green one (and it is
outside the triangle of verifiers).
when a player acts one action with a probability of one,
or they can be mixed, when a player randomizes over a set
of actions. The players’ strategies define an outcome (if the
strategies are pure) or a randomization over the outcomes (if
mixed). Players have preferences over the outcomes expressed
by utility functions and each player is rational, acting to
maximize its own utility. Solving a game means to find a
profile of strategies (i.e., a set specifying one strategy for
each player) such that the players’ strategies are somehow
in equilibrium. The most known equilibrium concept is Nash
where each player cannot improve its own utility by deviating
unilaterally (a detailed treatment of Nash equilibrium can be
found in [14]): a fundamental result in the study of equilibria
is that every game admits at least one Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies, while a pure strategy equilibrium might not
exist.
We now formally state our secure localization game, by
focusing on a setting with N = 3 verifiers (the minimum
number needed to apply VM). A secure localization game is
a tuple 〈Q,A, u〉. Set Q contains the players and is defined
as Q = {v,m} (v denotes the verifiers and m denotes the
malicious node). Set A contains the players actions. More
precisely, given a surface S ⊆ R2, the actions available to
v are all the possible tuples of positions 〈V1, V2, V3〉 of the
three verifiers with V1, V2, V3 ∈ S, while the actions available
to m are all the possible couples of positions 〈U,P 〉 with
U,P ∈ S (where U and P are defined in the previous section).
We denote by σv the strategy (possibly mixed) of v and by σm
the strategy (possibly mixed) of m. Given a strategy profile
σ = (σv, σm) in pure strategy, it is possible to check whether
or not constraints (1) are satisfied. The outcomes of the game
can be {MALICIOUS, ROBUST, UNKNOWN}. Set u contains the
players’ utility functions, denoted uv(·) and um(·) respec-
tively, that define their preferences over the outcomes. We
define ui(MALICIOUS) = ui(ROBUST) = 0 for i ∈ {v,m},
while ui(UNKNOWN) can be defined differently according
to different criteria. A simple criterion could be to assign
uv(UNKNOWN) = −1 and um(UNKNOWN) = 1. However,
our intuition is that the UNKNOWN outcomes are not the
same for the players, because m could prefer those in which
the distance between U and P is maximum. In particular
we propose three main criteria to characterize UNKNOWN
outcomes:
1) maximum deception, um is defined as the distance
between U and P , while uv is defined as the opposite;
2) deception area, um is defined as the size of the region
S′ ⊆ S such that P ∈ S′ is marked as UNKNOWN, while
uv is defined as the opposite;
3) deception shape, um is defined as the number of dis-
connected regions S′ ⊆ S such that P ∈ S′ is marked
as UNKNOWN, while uv is defined as the opposite.
Players could even use different criteria, e.g., v and m could
adopt the maximum deception criterion and the deception
shape respectively. However, when players adopt the same
criterion, the game is zero-sum, the sum of the players’ utilities
being zero. This class of games is easy and has the property
that the maxmin, minmax, and Nash strategies are the same.
In this case calculations are simplified by the property that
uv = −um; in the following we shall adopt this assumption.
IV. GAME ANALYSIS
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the case in which
both players adopt the maximum deception criterion. In prin-
ciple, however, our analysis can be extended to other criteria:
in particular, Theorem 4.1 is valid for all the proposed criteria.
A. Analysis with Pure Strategies
In this section, we show that there can be no equilibrium
in pure strategies. We discuss also what is the value of the
maximum deception when the verifiers adopts a pure strategy.
We consider only the case in which ∀i, j ViVj ≤ R since
otherwise the region in which VM would be applicable is
small and no UNKNOWN positions would be possible, thus
paradoxically the verifiers would have an incentive to reduce
it further to only one point, making the localization procedure
worthless.
At first, we can show that for each action of the verifiers,
there exists an action of the malicious node such that this is
marked as UNKNOWN.
Theorem 4.1: For each tuple 〈V1, V2, V3〉 such that ViVj ≤
R for all i, j, there exists at least a couple 〈U,P 〉 such that
um > 0.
Proof. Given V1, V2, V3 such that ViVj ≤ R for all i, j,
choose a Vi and call X the point on the line VkVj (k, j 6= i)
closest to Vi (see Figure 3). Assign U = X . Consider the line
connecting Vi to X , assign P to be any point X ′ on this line
such that ViX ≤ ViX ′ ≤ R. Then, by construction um > 0.

We discuss what is the configuration of the three verifiers,
such that the maximal deception is minimized.
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Fig. 3. Construction of plausible positions X′
Theorem 4.2: Any tuple 〈V1, V2, V3〉 such that ViVj = R
for all i, j minimizes the maximum deception.
Proof. Since we need to minimize the maximum distance
between two points, by symmetry, the triangle whose vertexes
are V1, V2, V3 must have all the edges with the same length.
We show that ViVj = R. It can easily seen, by geometric
construction, that U must be necessarily inside the triangle. As
shown in Section 2, P must be necessarily outside the triangle
and, by definition, the optimal P will be on the boundary
constituted by some circle with center in a Vi and range equal
to R (otherwise P could be moved farther and P would not be
optimal). As ViVj decreases, the size of the triangle reduces,
while the boundary keeps to be the same, and therefore UP
does not decrease. 
We are now in the position to find the maxmin value (in pure
strategies) of the verifiers, i.e., the action that maximizes the
verifiers’ utility given that the malicious node will minimize it.
The problem of finding the maxmin strategy can be formulated
as the following non-linear optimization problem:
max
constraints (1)
UP
for some V1, V2, V3 with
ViVj = R for all i, j
We solved this problem by using conjugated subgradients.
We report the solution. Called W the orthocenter of the trian-
gle, U and P can be easily expressed with polar coordinates
with origin in W . We assume that θ = 0 corresponds to a line
connecting W to a Vi. We have, U = (ρ = 0.1394R, θ = pi6 )
and P = (ρ = 0.4286R, θ = pi6 + 0.2952), and, for
symmetry, U = (ρ = 0.1394R, θ = −pi6 ) and P = (ρ =
0.4286R, θ = −pi6 − 0.2952). Therefore, there are six optimal
couples 〈U,P 〉s. In Figure 4 depicts the malicious node’s best
action, by showing on the right all the symmetrical positions.
The value of um (i.e., the maximum deception) is 0.2516R.
In other words, when the verifiers compose an equilateral
triangle, a malicious node can masquerade as unknown and the
maximum deception is about 25% of the verifiers’ range R.
We consider the verifiers’ strategy and we show that for
V1 V2
V3
U
P
(a)
V1 V2
V3
WU
P
U
P
U
P
U
PU
P
U
P
(b)
Fig. 4. Malicious node’s best responses (maximum deception is UP =
0.2516R).
each action of the malicious node they can find an action
such that the malicious node is marked either as ROBUST or
as MALICIOUS.
Theorem 4.3: For each couple 〈U,P 〉, there exists at least
a tuple 〈V1, V2, V3〉 such that uv = 0.
Proof. If U ≡W (where W is the orthocenter of the equi-
lateral triangle composed by the verifiers), then, by geometric
construction, maximum deception is zero (see Figure 5). 
By combining Theorems 4.1 and 4.3, we have that our game
cannot admit any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Indeed,
for each σv there exists a best response σm such that σv is
not the best response to σm.
B. Discrete Approximation Hardness
Finding a mixed strategy equilibrium in a two-player zero-
sum finite game is well known to be a polynomial problem
in the number of actions available to the players. This is
because the problem of finding a minmax strategy can be
formulated as a linear mathematical programming problem.
However, our problem is not finite, V1, V2, V3, U, P belonging
to a continuous space. In this section, we show that finding an
approximate solution by discretizing the surface S in a finite
number of points is not practically affordable.
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Fig. 5. The only plausible P ≡ U when U ≡W
We discretize S by a finite grid with a given step ∆. We
call Sd ⊂ S the set of points in the grid. The players can
choose their position from set Sd. We denote by Av and
Am the set of actions of the verifiers and malicious node
respectively. Supposed Sd to be a square and called l the
length of S, the number of points in Sd is |Sd| = d l∆e2.
We have that |Av| =
∑
3≤i≤|V |
(|Sd|2
i
) ∼ O(|Sd|6) and
|Am| = |Sd|2 · (|Sd|2 − 1) ∼ O(|Sd|4). For each possible
profile of players’ actions we compute um as the maximum
deception. Notice that the number of all the possible profiles
of players’ actions is ∼ O(|Sd|10). We denote by pv(i) the
probability with which v plays action i ∈ Av. The linear
programming formulation to find the minmax strategy (and
equivalently the Nash equilibrium) is:
minu (2)∑
i∈Av
pu(i)um(j, i) ≤ u ∀j ∈ Am (3)
pu(i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Av (4)∑
i∈Av
pu(i) = 1 (5)
Constraints (3) force the expected utility m receives from
taking action j to be not larger than u; constraints (4) and
(5) grant probabilities pm(·) to be well defined. The objective
function is the minimization of u that by constraints (3) is the
maximal expected utility of m.
We solved the above mathematical programming problem
with grids with 3, 4, 5 points per edge. In all these case studies,
the verifiers always mark the malicious node as robust or
malicious, and therefore um is always equal to zero. We notice
that the utility matrix presents a number of non-null values,
anyway, there exists at least a configuration of verifiers such
that for no action of the malicious node this is marked as
unknown. This is because the grid is too loose. However,
with a larger number of points per edge, the problem is not
computationally affordable because the number of outcomes
is excessively large.
C. Mixed Strategies with a Fixed Orthocenter
The hardness result discussed in the previous section pushed
us to resort to an analytical approach to find the players’
equilibrium strategies. Here, we discuss the strategies in a
simplified case study. The idea is that this result can provide
insight to solve the general case.
At first we show that any equilibrium strategy prescribes
that the players randomize over a continuous space of action.
Call supp(σi) the set of actions played with strictly positive
probability by player i in σi.
Theorem 4.4: In the secure localization game, no equilib-
rium strategy σ = (σv, σm) can have |supp(σi)| ∈ N (i.e.,
supp(σi) is a continuous space).
Proof. A necessary and sufficient condition such that a
game with continuous actions admits an equilibrium where
players randomize over a finite number of actions is that
the continuous variables in the players’ utility functions are
separable, i.e., the utility functions can be expressed as the
product of terms composed of only sum of variables. This
does not hold in our case. 
We consider the situation in which the orthocenter W
of the triangle constituted of the three verifiers is a given
data. By Theorem 4.2, we know that the optimal verifiers’
configuration is the equilateral triangle with edge’s length
equal to R. Consider the polar coordinate system with pole
in the orthocenter W . Call α the angle between the polar
axis and the line connecting a vertex Vi to W . Since the
verifiers must form an equilateral triangle and the verifiers
have distance equal to R from the pole, the verifiers’ strategy
can be compactly represented as a probability density over α.
Instead, the malicious node’s strategy can be represented as
a probability density over U and P . We can show that the
players’ equilibrium strategies are the following.
Theorem 4.5: The players’ equilibrium strategies are:
σ∗v = α uniformly drawn from [0,
2pi
3
]
σ∗m =

U
{
ρU = 0.1394R
θU = uniformly drawn from [0, 2pi]
P
{
ρP = 0.4286R
θP = θU + 0.2952
and the expected utility of the malicious node is 0.001R.
Proof. By Theorem 4.4, the players must randomize over
a continuous space of actions. We consider the verifiers’
strategy. Easily, for symmetry reasons, the verifiers must
randomize uniformly over all the possible values of α. In par-
ticular, we can safely limit the randomization over [0, 2/3pi].
We consider the malicious node’s strategy. For symmetry, it
randomize such that θu is uniformly drawn from [0, 2pi]. In
order to compute the optimal ρU and the polar coordinates
of P , we solve the following optimization problem. We fix a
value for θu and we search for the values of ρU , ρP , θP such
that the malicious node’s expected utility is the maximum one.
max
ρU ,ρp,θP
∫ 2pi
3
0
um
2pi
3
dα (6)
The above optimization problem is non-linear. We solved it by
discretizing the value of α with a step of 10−3 and by using
conjugated subgradients. The result is the strategy reported
above. 
Notice that, the expected utility of the malicious node
drastically decreases with respect to the situation in which the
strategy of the verifiers is pure, as it is 0.001R with mixed
strategy vs. 0.25R with pure strategies. This is because with
mixed strategies, the probability that the malicious node is
not marked as robust or malicious is very small. Therefore,
randomization over their strategies aids the verifiers to increase
their expected utility and VM with mixed strategies can be
considered to be robust.
V. CONCLUSION
The assessment of the trustworthiness of wireless sensor
node localization information is a fundamental challenge in or-
der to provide further trust to applications and data. Verifiable
Multilateration is a secure localization algorithm that defines
two tests for evaluating node behavior as malicious, robust or
— as a ultimate choice — as unknown. In case of unknown
nodes, VM does not have enough information for evaluating
the trustworthiness of the node. This lack of information may
be exploited by a malicious user. In this paper we modeled VM
has as a strategic non-cooperative game, on order to study the
overall equilibrium properties of the system. We considered
a verifier player against a malicious node and we analyzed
the behavior in case of the adoption of both pure strategies
and a mixed ones. The conducted analysis demonstrates that,
when the verifiers play a pure strategy, the malicious node
can always masquerade as unknown with a probability of one
and the induced deception could be not negligible. Instead,
when the verifiers play mixed strategies, the malicious node
can masquerade as unknown with a very low probability and
the expected deception is virtually negligible.
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